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COMMENTS 
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW-MERGERS-AN UPDATING OF THE 
"FAILING COMPANY" DOCTRINE IN THE AMENDED SECTION 7 SET-
TING-Section 7 of the Clayton Act1 was enacted to supplement 
the operation of the Sherman Act2 in preserving the competitive 
system of our economy by preventing monopoly and undue con-
centration in American industry.3 As enacted, section 7 was in-
tended to reach concentration by mergers in their incipiency and 
before they reached the level of restraints of trade or monopoly 
probabilities under the Sherman Act.4 However, the original 
sec_tion 7 soon appeared to be an inadequate tool to accomplish 
this purpose, primarily because it prevented only acquisitions of 
stock and not of assets.5 In 1950, the section was amended to 
reach any acquisition of stock or assets which might substantially 
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.6 Thus strength-
ened, section 7 has been utilized by the Department of Justice 
and the Federal Trade Commission with considerable success in 
preventing unlawful mergers and in disentangling those which 
have already occurred.7 
Even though application of section 7 has become increasingly 
effective, a specific exception to its coverage has been recognized 
by Congress8 and the Supreme Court.9 This exception is com-
monly referred to as the "failing company" doctrine. In short. 
the doctrine holds that an acquired or to-be-acquired firm which 
is in a "failing" condition, or the acquiring corporation, may 
1 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958), amending 38 Stat. 731 (1914). 
2 Sherman Act §§ I, 2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ I, 2 (1958). 
s See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315 (1962); H.R. REP. No. 1191, 
81st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1949); 96 CONG. R.Ec. 16433 (1950) (remarks of Senator O'Conor). 
See also United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945). 
4 38 Stat. 731-32 (1914) provided: "[N]o corporation engaged in commerce shall ac-
quire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital 
of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where the effect of such acquisition 
may be to substantially lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is so 
acquired and the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in 
any section or community, or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." 
5 See Arrow-Hart &: Hegeman Elec. Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587 (1934); FTC v. 
Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926). For a brief summary of § 7's weaknesses prior 
to the 1950 amendment, see REPORT OF An'Y GEN. NAT'L CoMM. To STUDY THE ANTI· 
n.usr LA.ws 115-17 (1955). For a discussion of the doctrine, see Wiley, The "Failing 
Company": A Real Defense in Horizontal Merger Cases, 41 B.U.L. R.Ev. 495 (1961). 
6 See note I supra. 
7 See Handler &: Robinson, A Decade of Administration of the Celler-Kefauver 
Antimerger Act, 61 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 629 (1961). 
s See H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949); S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 
2d Sess. 7 (1950); 96 CoNG. R.Ec. 16434-35 (1950). 
9 See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930). 
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interpose this condition as a defense to any prosecution under 
section 7 seeking to prevent or undo the acquisition of the failing 
company's stock or assets by the other. This discussion will at-
tempt to explore the development of the doctrine, consider its 
significance and justification in our competitive system, and sug-
gest possible guidelines for its application. 
l. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE "FAILING COMPANY" 
DOCTRINE PRIOR TO 1950 
The first attempt to formulate an exception to the antitrust 
laws based on the potential financial failure of a competitor was 
made in American Press Ass'n v. United States,1° a Sherman Act 
prosecution. In that case, the American Press Association was 
acquired by Western Newspaper Union, its only competitor in 
the relevant printing market. The acquisition was held not to 
result in an undue restraint of trade or the creation of a monopoly 
within the meaning of the Sherman Act since it was not injurious 
to the public interest, but, on the contrary, was beneficial to the 
public.11 Supporting this contention were the facts that: (a) the 
market was in decline, with American and Western representing 
the only survivors; (b) American had been losing 3,000 dollars 
per month and was not able to build the modern printing facilities 
necessary to enable it to achieve competitive status; and (c) there 
were no other probable buyers for the failing firm's assets. These 
facts convinced the court that if the merger had been prevented 
American would soon have failed, leaving Wes tern as the sole 
producer in the industry.12 Injury to the public would have re-
sulted from the destruction of a usable plant, and stockholder 
damage would have been represented by the lost value of the 
company as a going concern and the constantly diminishing worth 
of its idle assets. The court indicated that an agreement between 
American and Wes tern setting prices at levels sufficiently high to 
provide profits for American would have avoided the consequences 
of failure and maintained a competitor in the field. This solution 
would still have caused the public to suffer, however, since the 
public would have been paying for the "profitable operation of 
an inefficient concern [which] is an injury," and, therefore, it was 
rejected.13 Under either remaining alternative-allowing the pur-
10 245 Fed. 91 (7th Cir. 1917). 
11 Id. at 93. 
12 Ibid. 
1s Ibid. 
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chase, or preventing it with the ultimate consequence that Amer-
ican would fail-Western would still remain alone in the industry. 
Since the merger course would not increase the injury to the pub-
lic that was likely to occur regardless of the choice, and would be 
beneficial in the respects outlined above, the court concluded that 
the purchase did not violate the antitrust laws. 
This defense again appeared, although not in definitive form, in 
the first Aluminum Co. case,14 where the Aluminum Company and 
the Cleveland Company had devised a complex plan for joint 
ownership in a third company to be formed-the Aluminum Rol-
ling Mills Company. The court found, in this section 7 case, that 
such a transaction would have the effect of substantially lessening 
competition between the Cleveland Company and the Aluminum 
Company, and, in addition, that the purchase of the Rolling Mills 
stock by the Aluminum Company would tend to create a monop-
oly.15 The Aluminum Company contended that its intent was not 
to by-pass the Clayton Act but rather to gain capacity to meet the 
demands of war production and to relieve Cleveland of a difficult 
business situation in which it was incurring losses.16 The majority 
opinion summarily dismissed this contention indicating that effect 
rather than motive was controlling, and found that the effect here 
was illegal under the act. The dissent, 17 on the other hand, argued 
that the transaction represented a prudent business decision with 
a legitimate purpose. If it had been otherwise, the Aluminum 
Company could merely have waited a short time until both Cleve-
land and Rolling Mills had failed and then acquired the Rolling 
Mills stock or assets. 
The second Aluminum Co. case18 bore out the prophecy voiced 
by the dissent in the earlier decision.19 With the Cleveland Com-
pany having permanently terminated all business activities, the 
Aluminum Company indicated that it would bring a creditor's 
bill to collect on notes owed to it by Rolling Mills, which itself 
had ceased operations. The FTC sought to prevent this action on 
the ground that the Aluminum Company, as the judgment credi-
tor, would acquire the assets at the ensuing sheriff's sale, which 
result would be contrary to the holding in the first Aluminum Co. 
14 Aluminum Co. of America v. FTC, 284 Fed. 401 (3d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 
261 U.S. 616 (1923). 
15 Id. at 408. 
16 Ibid. 
11 Id. at 409-11. 
18 Aluminum Co. of America v. FTC, 299 Fed. 361 (3d Cir. 1924). 
10 284 Fed. at 409-11. 
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case. The court decided that since Cleveland had withdrawn from 
the industry and Rolling Mills was competitively dead, section 7 
would not deprive a creditor of his right to collect debts owing to 
him in the manner prescribed by law.20 
The true foundations of the "failing company" doctrine were 
laid in the famous Supreme Court decision in International Shoe 
Co. v. FTC.21 In that case the International Shoe Company had 
acquired the stock of the W. H. McElwain Company in a trans-
action involving two of the largest shoe manufacturers in the 
world. The Court held in the alternative that: (I) the two com-
panies were not competitors in the relevant market and, accord-
ingly, there was no indication that the merger might substantially 
lessen competition;22 and (2) section 7 should not be applied 
where the acquired company is in a failing condition23 (this latter 
holding being the prime concern of this discussion). 
The facts supporting the second holding24 indicated that the 
McElwain Company had sustained a loss in excess of 6,000,000 
dollars in 1920, which had wiped out its surplus and left a deficit 
of about 4,900,000 dollars. The corporation also owed 15,000,000 
dollars to banks and trust companies and an additional 2,000,000 
dollars on current accounts. In 1921, production had fallen to 
about 15 percent of capacity, and dividend payments had stopped 
on common and second preferred stock and were to be discon-
tinued on first preferred. Finally, the annual filing of the financial 
statements required by the law of Massachusetts would have dis-
closed the firm's insolvency and brought it to the point of in-
voluntary liquidation. 
Against this setting the situation of International Shoe was 
vividly contrasted.25 The company was in excellent financial con-
dition and its efficiency had even justified a reduction in its shoe 
prices. Business had increased by about 25 percent and the com-
pany found itself unable to fill its orders due to a lack of capacity. 
McElwain approached International Shoe with the idea of selling 
out. The merger was accomplished by means of exchanging securi-
ties rather than by purchase of assets, so that the acquired facilities 
could be put into operation quickly by existing personnel. After 
20 299 Fed. at 365. 
21 280 U.S. 291 (1930). 
22 Id. at 299. 
23 Id. at 302-03. 
!H Id. at 299-300. 
25 Id. at 300-01. 
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summarizing the above facts, the Court indicated that the possible 
alternatives open to McElwain, such as securing additional loans 
or receivership, were, at best, speculative and provided no assur-
ance that such action would save the corporation. The acquisition, 
therefore, would not be invalidated merely because such alterna-
tives existed.26 
That oft-quoted paragraph which has been interpreted as the 
first concrete formulation of the "failing company" doctrine then 
followed: 
"In the light of the case thus disclosed of a corporation 
with resources so depleted and the prospect of rehabilitation 
so remote that it faced the grave probability of a business 
failure with resulting loss to its stockholders and injury to 
the communities where its plants were operated, we hold 
that the purchase of its capital stock by a competitor (there 
being no other prospective purchaser), not with a purpose 
to lessen competition, but to facilitate the accumulated busi-
ness of the purchaser and with the effect of mitigating seri-
ously injurious consequences otherwise probable, is not in 
contemplation of law prejudicial to the public and does not 
substantially lessen competition or restrain commerce within 
the intent of the Clayton Act. To regard such a transaction as 
a violation of law, as this Court suggested in United States 
v. U.S. Steel Gorp., 251 U.S. 417, 446-447, would 'seem a dis-
tempered view of purchase and result.' See also American 
Press Ass'n v. United States, 245 Fed. 91, 93-94.''27 
The importance of this paragraph28 necessitates a careful examina-
tion of its language and structure, both now, and, in more detail, 
later.29 The Court initially reiterated the factual conclusions in 
the case and then applied a doctrine which focused upon the 
motive of the purchase and the probable effect on the public if 
section 7 were construed to prevent the merger. 
As a result of the line of authority culminating in the Inter-
national Shoe decision, the concept of a "failing company" defense 
had passed beyond the amorphous state and had at least been 
crystallized to the extent that its existence as a possible justifica-
26 Id. at 301-02. 
21 Id. at 302-03. 
28 This paragraph has been relied on by Congress as authority for its assertion that 
the "failing company" doctrine does in fact exist as an exception to § 7, and that it 
should remain so under the amendment (see note 8 supra). 
29 See text at 574, 582-83 infra. 
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tion for an otherwise unlawful merger was acknowledged. ·No at-
tempt had been made at a thorough definitive assessment of the 
thrust and import of the doctrine, however, and it received no 
further serious attention until after the passage of the 1950 amend-
ment to section 7 .30 
IL RECOGNITION AND TREATMENT OF THE DOCTRINE SUBSEQUENT 
TO p ASSAGE OF AMENDED SECTION 7 
The legislative history relating to the amended section 7 of 
the Clayton Act contains expressions by Congress of its intent 
to exclude from the statute's coverage bankruptcy and receiver-
ship cases, and to extend the exclusion to situations where the 
acquired company was not in a state of bankruptcy, but was head-
ing in that direction with the probability that bankruptcy would 
ensue.31 Thus, "the bill would not apply to a company in a failing 
or bankrupt condition."32 In expounding a definition of the doc-
trine, both the Senate and the House contented themselves with 
reciting the previously quoted and well-known passage from Inter-
national Shoe.33 It is perhaps unfortunate that Congress did not 
verbalize its own thoughts as to the scope of the defense. This has 
led some writers to doubt that the doctrine exists at all;34 never-
theless, it has been since recognized in numerous judicial and ad-
ministrative decisions.35 Indeed, Representative Celler, co-sponsor 
of the 1950 Celler-Kefauver amendment to section 7, in hearings 
on a possible later amendment of the act to include banks,86 re-
affirmed the House report in stating that "any entity that would 
30 In Beegle v. Thomson, 138 F.2d 875, 881 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 
743 (1944), the court in dictum indicated that a firm closing out its business because 
of financial difficulties could sell its facilities to a competitor without violating the 
antitrust laws. 
31 See note 8 supra. 
32 96 CoNG. REc. 16435 (1950). 
33 See text at note 27 supra; see also note 8 supra. 
34 This view has been expressly stated in Connor, Section 7 of the Clayton Act: 
The "Failing Company" Myth, 49 GEo. L.J. 84 (1961); see also Note, 45 VA. L. REv. 421, 
427 (1959). 
35 See Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 831-32 (9th Cir. 1961); Erie 
Sand &: Gravel Co. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 279, 280-81 (3d Cir. 1961); United States v. Diebold, 
Inc., 197 F. Supp. 902 (S.D. Ohio 1961), rerld, 369 U.S. 654 (1962); United States v. 
Maryland &: Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 799, 808-09 (D.D.C. 1958), affd 
in part and rev'd in part, 362 U.S. 458 (1960); Farm Journal, Inc., 53 F.T.C. 26, 47-48 
(1956). See also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 331 (1962), where the 
Court recognized the intent of Congress to preserve the "failing company" doctrine. 
36 Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the 
Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 7, at I (1955). 
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be in a bad condition, could be taken over without violating the 
law."37 
Recent cases in which the defense has been raised have not 
indicated a willingness by the courts to grapple with the con-
ceptual problems involved in delimiting the scope and applica-
tion of the doctrine. In these cases, the firm in question was usually 
either growing and profitable or hopelessly insolvent and on the 
brink of bankruptcy. In Farm Journal, Inc.,38 it was determined 
that the purchase of the "Country Gentleman," a national farm 
magazine published by Curtis Publishing Company, by Farm 
Journal, the publisher of the only other national farm magazine, 
was in violation of the act. One of the defenses interposed was 
that "Country Gentleman" had been in a failing condition and 
had incurred large losses in recent years.39 In rejecting this de-
fense40 the Commission indicated that Curtis itself was financially 
successful and its large surpluses could have been used to establish 
"Country Gentleman" magazine as a profitable enterprise. The 
holding was based essentially on the determination that, in order 
for the doctrine to apply, the firm itself, and not merely one of 
its endeavors, must be in a failing state.41 The Commission also 
relied on the shaky financial condition of the acquiring company, 
Farm Journal, to distinguish this case from International Shoe.42 
The strength of the acquiring company's business position 
may, in several respects, justify a court in sustaining the defense. 
First, it indicates a legitimate need for the capacity, which negates 
the claim that the motive for acquisition was illegal;43 and, second-
ly, the sound financial condition of the acquirer tends to insure 
that the injury which the courts wish to prevent will, at least, be 
mitigated by keeping the facilities in operation and avoiding 
financial collapse.44 A valid motive for acquisition and the mitiga-
tion of probable injury can be found in Farm Journal, as well as 
in International Shoe, although in a somewhat different form. 
37 Id. at 10. This quote was in the context of a general discussion considering the 
necessity of inserting an "escape" proviso in the amendment to insure· that those banking 
corporations faced with a possibility or probability of ultimate failure would be allowed 
to merge. It was felt that the doctrine of International Shoe covered this particular 
situation and therefore the proviso was not needed. Id. at 9, 10. 
38 53 F.T.C. 26 (1956). 
39 Id. at 47. 
40 Id. at 47•48. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Id. at 48. 
43 See International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 301 (1930). 
44 Id. at 302. 
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Thus, the declining market for national farm magazines warranted 
a reduction in capacity, and merger has been recognized as one of 
the most painless and efficient means of accomplishing this legiti-
mate end.45 It is interesting to note that by the time the decision 
was handed dmrn the merger question had become practically 
moot:16 Curtis had ceased publication of "Country Gentleman" 
and Farm Journal had, for a considerable period, fully incorpo-
rated the valuable assets acquired by the transaction, such as ad-
vertising lists, subscriber lists, and use of the name "Country 
Gentleman" in conjunction with "Farm Journal." Divestiture at 
that late date was essentially a hollow remedy. 
The defense was again raised in Erie Sand & Gravel Co. v. 
FTC,47 where a liquidating corporation had sold out to the highest 
bidder, which happened to be a large competitor. In striking down 
the defense, the court stated that the mere fact the board of di-
rectors had made a final decision to liquidate the company did not 
permit what had been a prosperous firm up to the point of sale 
to come under the protection of the doctrine.48 "The picture 
presented by the prosperous Sandusky Division here was the anti-
thesis of such a 'failing company' situation"49 (referring to the 
condition of McElwain in International Shoe). Speaking of the 
defense, the court suggested that it may be permitted when the 
corporation is in such dire financial straits that its termination and 
subsequent dispersal of its assets seems inevitable.50 In determining 
whether the doctrine would be applicable in a particular case, the 
court indicated that the proper approach would involve a balanc-
ing with the possible injuries to the adverse interests involved.51 
For example, the probable damage to competition that may result 
if the merger is validated should be weighed against the likely 
injury to creditors, owners and employees of the corporation if 
it is prevented from selling out and thereafter fails. The precise 
45 Each of the two national farm magazines were sustaining substantial losses, and, 
therefore, the situation is similar to and probably more dire than that involved in 
American Press Ass'n v. United States, 245 Fed. 91 (7th Cir. 1917), where the antitrust 
laws (Sherman Act) were held not to apply. See also S. REP. No. 132, 85th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 24 (1957), in which Professor Weston of the University of California is quoted: 
"Mergers may represent the most effective method of achieving stability and progress 
at certain stages of industrial development. It may represent the most efficient method 
of combining facilities and disposing of obsolete and inefficient properties." 
46 Farm Journal, Inc., 53 F.T.C. 26, 49-51 (1956). 
47 291 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1961). 
48 Id. at 280-81. 
49 Id. at 281. 
liO Id. at 280. 
ul Id. at 281. 
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holding of the case, however, was less broad. In order for a firm 
which has decided to go out of business to qualify under the 
defense it cannot have been in a healthy condition at the time 
of acquisition, but rather must have exhibited failing charac-
teristics. 52 
Perhaps the most restrictive interpretation of the doctrine 
was rendered in Pillsbury Co.53 The initial position taken by the 
Commission was that International Shoe must be limited to its 
facts. Thus, if a firm sought to qualify for this exception, evidence 
must be submitted to prove that the company had been in a des-
perate situation, with (1) resources depleted, (2) rehabilitation re-
mote, and (3) the possibility of failure imminent.54 It is important 
to remember that these three elements, which apparently repre-
sented the FTC's approach to the defense, were extracted from 
the characterization of the facts in the critical paragraph of Inter-
national Shoe. No importance was attached to the holding which 
followed upon this characterization. Indeed, in attempting to 
reduce the potency of the "failing company" exception, it was 
suggested that there might be no exception at all.55 After exhibit-
ing a somewhat negative attitude toward the doctrine, the Com-
mission was nevertheless willing to apply the broad test suggested 
by respondent company,56 namely, whether there was a reason-
able probability that, if the merger had not been allowed, in-
solvency or bankruptcy would have ensued. Even under this 
standard the Commission concluded that the burden had not 
been sustained by the respondent. The summary of the facts in-
dicated a healthy enterprise with a long growth and profit history 
which was under some financial pressure due to a shortage of 
working capital.57 In addition, there had been prior offers to 
purchase the firm and another bid was outstanding at the time 
of the acceptance of Pillsbury's offer.58 
The essential facts in Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTCr,0 bear-
ing on the relevance of the doctrine were similar to those in 
Pillsbury Co. The history of the purportedly "failing" company 
52 Id. at 280-81. 
53 TRADE REG. REP. (1960-61 FTC Gas.) fl 29277, at 37617 (1960). 
54 Id. ,I 37629. 
55 Ibid. 
li6 Ibid. 
57 Id. ,I 37628-29. 
58 Id. ,I 37630. 
59 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961). 
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involved indicated a growth of net worth, net assets and net sales.60 
The company had been generally profitable during the ten-year 
period prior to its acquisition, although its earnings had slacked 
off toward the end of this period, 61 and it had experienced difficulty 
in financing an expansion and modernization program. 62 After 
enumerating these facts the court determined that at the time of 
acquisition, the acquired corporation was an effective competitor 
of the acquirer, and there was no sufficient reason to believe that 
it was in a failing or bankrupt condition.63 No attempt was made 
to define the "failing company" exception or its scope. 
The "failing company" defense was successfully employed in 
United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n64 and, more 
recently, in United States v. Diebold, Inc.65 In the Milk Producers 
case the court had before it for consideration the acquisition of 
three dairies in the same relevant market by a milk producers' 
co-operative. The purchase of the assets of the Embassy Dairy was 
condemned because of the horizontal and vertical threats to com-
petition that it posed. 66 In contrast, the acquisition of the other 
two dairies was permitted under the doctrine of International 
Shoe.61 Of these two companies, one had ceased operations al-
together because of financial difficulties while the other was hope-
lessly insolvent, being deeply in debt to the acquirer and on the 
brink of bankruptcy.68 
In the Diebold case,69 the court listed many factors which 
tended to portray the corporation as one hopelessly insolvent and 
faced with imminent receivership.70 The acquisition was, there-
fore, not violative of section 7. The court felt that the acquired 
company, because of its desperate financial condition, could not 
long have survived as an independent competitor and that an 
alternative sale could not have been secured.71 Injury to employees, 
creditors and stockholders of the failing corporation upon the 
60 Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 831-32 (9th Cir. 1961). 
61 Id, at 832. 
62 Id. at 831. 
63 Id. at 832. 
64 167 F. Supp. 799 (D.D.C. 1958). 
65 197 F. Supp. 902 (S.D. Ohio 1961). 
66 167 F. Supp. at 807. 
61 Id. at 808-09. 
68 Id. at 808. 
69 United States v. Diebold, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 902 (S.D. Ohio 1961). On appeal to 
the Supreme Court, the decision was reversed on a determination that the facts were 
not sufficient to establish a basis for summary judgment. 369 U.S. 654 (1962). 
70 197 F. Supp. at 903-05. 
11 Id. at 907. 
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probable liquidation of the firm was cited as the justification for 
recognition of the defense.72 It is significant that the court but-
tressed its conclusion by observing that after the merger there 
had been a continued decline in the amount of business attribut-
able to the operation of the acquired facilities; and, but for the 
merger, the acquired firm would have unquestionably experienced 
a total business collapse.73 
III. THE SIGNIFICANCE AND JUSTIFICATION OF THE "FAILING 
COMPANY" DOCTRINE IN THE SECTION 7 SETTING 
It is abundantly clear that none of the cases have adequately 
undertaken a thorough examination of the conceptual elements 
contained in the "failing company" defense, or of the appropriate 
criteria to be used in testing a particular factual situation. Since 
the facts in these decisions were either extremely favorable or un-
favorable to the interposition of the defense, there was no need to 
explore critically the gray area in determining the scope of its 
application. However, there was language in some of the decisions 
which indicated that the rule of International Shoe was based on 
the absence of a substantial lessening of competition between the 
firms because the acquired failing firm had no longer been able 
to compete effectively with the acquiring corporation.74 While 
this interpretation might have been possible under the old sec-
tion 7, 75 it is fallacious to assume that these grounds would neces-
sarily support an acquisition examined under the standards of 
amended section 7.76 It must be remembered that the proscribed 
72 Ibid. 
73 Id. at 906-07. 
74 In United States v. Maryland &: Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 167 F. Supp. 709 
(D.D.C. 1958), the court stated that the acquisition of capital stock or assets is not 
within the ban of § 7 "because the acquisition of a failing corporation that is on the 
verge of going out of business cannot result in lessening competition or in creating a 
monopoly." Id. at 808. Similar indications can be found in Pillsbury Co., TRADE R.I:c. 
REP. (1960-61 FTC Cas.) ,r 29277 (1960), in rejecting respondent's contention that the 
defense applied. "This would be so even if, as respondent contends, the International 
Shoe case establishes an absolute defense in Section 7 cases, rather than merely estab• 
lishing imminent insolvency as one of the relevant factors in assessing competitive 
effect." Id. ,r 37629. (Emphasis added.) The language in United States v. Diebold, Inc., 
197 F. Supp. 902 (S.D. Ohio 1961), although somewhat ambiguous, tends to support a 
similar interpretation. Thus, the merger "did not threaten, or actually cause a lessening 
of competition within the meaning of Section 7 ...• " Id. at 907. See also Connor, supra 
note 34, at 98-99; Webster, The Clayton Act Today: Merging and Marketing, NEw YoRK 
STATE BAR .ANTITRUST LAW SYMPOSIUM 74, 100 (CCH 1955); Comment, 68 YALE L.J. 1627, 
1663-64 (1959). Compare Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and 
Economics, 74 HARv. L. REv. 226, 340 (1960). 
75 See note 4 supra. 
76 Clayton Act § 7, as amended, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958), provides: 
"No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole 
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activity has been expanded by the amendment to cover the ac-
quisition of assets as well as stock, and is applicable to vertical as 
well as horizontal mergers; nor is it limited merely to the lessening 
of competition between actual competitors.77 Furthermore, recent 
judicial interpretations78 have indicated that investigations for 
violation can focus on submarkets and subproducts, thereby in-
cluding within the sweep of amended section 7 a greater variety 
of acquisitions than were reached by its predecessor. 
It is not difficult to imagine situations where acquisition of a 
competitively feeble firm would not have created a substantial 
lessening of competition under the old act, but would be con-
demned under the amendment unless there exists a true exception 
to section 7. Purchase by a dominant firm of the assets of a com-
petitively dying company could have the following anti-competi-
tive effects. 
(a) It would enable a dominant firm to move quickly and 
cheaply into a new market by acquisition of a failing company 
where, but for the doctrine, the transaction would be in violation 
of section 7. 79 
(b) By increasing the acquiring firm's capacity to fill orders 
which it would otherwise be unable to accept, the company could 
strengthen its position in the market and prevent competitors 
from handling the overflow of business that would otherwise re-
suit. 80 
(c) By removing productive facilities from the market a po-
or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part 
of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of 
commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be sub-
stantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." 
77 See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); Maryland & Va. 
Milk Producers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 362 U.S. 458 (1960); United States v. E. I. 
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 
168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). 
78 E.g., see authorities cited in note 77 supra. 
70 Except for the lack of a failing company, this situation was presented in United 
States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948), in which the merger of United States 
Steel with Columbia Steel escaped Sherman Act condemnation. According to Senator 
Kefauver, "if section 7 of the Clayton Act had been amended as the [then] pending 
bill propos[ed], the acquisition which was made by the United States Steel Corp. in 
that case would not have been permitted." 96 CONG. R.Ec. 16502 (1950). Since United 
States Steel and Columbia Steel were not competitors in the relevant market, the 
import of this statement must be that acquisition of existing facilities by a dominant 
firm is in itself anti-competitive. 
so In International Shoe Co. v. FTC, the Court indicated that International Shoe 
had been forced to cancel orders because of insufficient capacity. 280 U.S. at 300-01. 
Therefore, if it were necessary to build new facilities, the time delay would presumably 
have caused a diffusion of orders throughout the industry to other competitors. 
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tential entrant might be forestalled from entry since he would 
face the increased cost of building new facilities and having these 
new facilities swell the total productive capacity of the market.81 
(d) The acquiring firm would probably obtain less of the 
business of the defunct company if the latter experienced total 
business collapse than if it effectively stepped into the shoes of 
the failing company and appropriated the remaining good will 
plus valuable customer lists, price data and other important busi-
ness information.82 
(e) Of increasing importance, a large enterprise could verti-
cally integrate by purchasing a failing company and thereby elimi-
nate a customer of or supplier to other competitors, depending on 
whether the integration was backward or forward, respectively, 
which might result in a substantial lessening of competition in 
the relevant market. 83 
(f) Such an acquisition might give the acquiring firm an in-
creased percentage of the market and increased market dominance, 
which has in itself been viewed as an undesirable result.84 
This summarization of possible anti-competitive consequences 
of a failing firm merger is not intended, however, to support the 
hypothesis that there should be no "failing company" doctrine. 
Rather, it is designed to shed light on the problems that must be 
realistically faced in any consideration of the applicability of the 
doctrine. In short, it must be realized that the doctrine represents 
a valid exception to section 7, and, but for the exception, the trans-
action would be illegal as violative of the antitrust laws. 
It is reasonable to assume that Congress foresaw that substan-
81 Professor Weston pointed out that "for many reasons the securities of a company 
may be selling below replacement costs of the firm's assets." S. REP. No. 132, 85th Cong., 
1st Sess. 23 (1957). Thus, a potential entrant who must build new facilities would be 
faced with greater costs than if he could have purchased the existing assets. Professor 
Weston also indicated that most companies would desire to increase their own capacity 
without expanding that of the market generally. Ibid. It is logical to assume that a 
new entrant faced with existing competitors would not wish to create a greater capacity 
in the market which would tend to increase the amount of competition he would face. 
82 Compare Comment, supra note 74, at 1663-64. 
83 See authorities cited in note 77 supra. 
84 Where one of the largest producers of aluminum products acquired one of eight 
competitors in the relevant market of aluminum "florist foil," it was held to be in 
violation of § 7, even though the large producer had not been in the field prior to 
acquisition. Reynolds Metals Co., 56 F.T.C. 743 (1960). The Commission specifically ex-
cluded as the grounds of the decision such factors as a possible lessening of competition 
through vertical integration, or the long growth history of Reynolds by means of 
merger. Id. at 774. Apparently the basis of the decision was that there was an actual 
lessening of competition because Reynolds, due to its size and resources, had upset the 
status quo of the market and caused some of the previously evenly balanced competitors 
to begin incurring losses. Id. at 774-76. 
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tial advantages to the public could be obtained by engrafting an 
exception on the apparent commands of section 7.85 Although 
overlapping and intertwined, various economic, business, com-
petitive and social justifications support recognition of the doc-
trine. First, a doctrine which allows a company to sell out before 
it has taken the "last gasp" in its business life minimizes the prob-
able injury to employees, creditors, shareholders and the com-
munity in which the facilities are located.86 The sale of plant and 
equipment as a going concern would probably result in continued 
operation of the facilities, thereby continuing to afford jobs to the 
employees and support to the community.87 The value of a going 
concern would be greater than the income received from the dis-
tress sale of its assets,88 and creditors would be more likely to col-
lect their debts and shareholders could salvage a greater propor-
tion of their investments. 
Secondly, the determination of whether a declining company 
has, in fact, reached the "last-gasp" stage so as to assure the legality 
of its acquisition under section 7 may be an extremely difficult 
one. Since there is no clear-cut guide as to when the corporation 
has qualified under the exception, other than when in receiver-
ship or bankruptcy, this may cause the parties to hesitate at the 
prospect of a merger until the "last gasp" has indeed been taken, 
with the consequence that the corporation will then have already 
lost most of its value as a going concern. In addition, there might 
well be no buyer at this late date willing to burden itself with 
such a decaying company. 
Thirdly, the public might best be served by allowing a firm 
which will probably fail to leave the industry at the earliest pos-
sible time. By doing so, the inefficient producer would be weeded 
out before there has been a lengthy misallocation of resources. 89 
For example, an efficient enterprise that is working at overcapacity 
could acquire a failing company with unused capacity, thereby 
maximizing the output of both.90 Similarly, the "last gasp" test 
85 See 96 CoNG. REc. 16435 (1950). 
86 See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. ITC, 280 U.S. 291, 302-03 (1930). 
87 As pointed out by the former Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, Edward 
F. Howrey, the major reason for mergers is the desire by the acquiring firm to obtain 
additional capacity without creating increased competition. This was cited as the primary 
motive in two out of five mergers. S. REP. No. 132, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1957). It is 
obvious that, with this motive, the acquired facilities would be kept in operation 
with resulting benefits to the community. 
88 See American Press Ass'n v. United States, 245 Fed. 91, 93 (7th Cir. 1917). 
811 See BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 51-55, 437-39 (1959). 
DO This situation was present in International Shoe Co. v. ITC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930). 
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may be injurious to the public if it keeps an inefficient submar-
ginal producer in the industry, thereby tying up additional re-
sources that under a normal competitive situation would be 
diverted into more productive activities which benefit the whole 
economy.91 
Finally, the "last gasp" approach does not take cognizance 
of modern business and economic realities. There may be circum-
stances in which a firm is faced with a probability of failure even 
though it has not as yet experienced a long loss history or become 
insolvent. Great technological advancements in certain industries 
which substantially lower the cost per unit ratio might soon place 
a company that cannot avail itself of these advancements in the 
"definitely failing" category.92 Many reasons exist for the inability 
to take advantage of technological advancements. A company 
might not have sufficient business volume to achieve the "econo-
mies of scale"93 inherent in the new methods and machinery which 
would be required to derive profits from the investment. The 
huge outlay required for purchase of such technology may be a 
factor preventing such action. A possible market decline might 
put the squeeze on the efficient, and especially the inefficient pro-
ducer, 94 with ordinary business sense dictating to the latter that 
the large investments necessary to become competitive are not 
justified. Another problem faced by the marginal and submarginal 
firms might be the increased cost of production.95 Thus, costs 
which are tolerable to an efficient company could force a low or 
no profit producer to the realization that the business's end is 
near. A prime example of this is so-called "pattern bargaining,"96 
by which the gains of labor at the expense of an efficient company 
are imposed on the less efficient members of the industry.97 
91 See BAIN, op. cit. supra note 89, at 437-39. The misallocation there outlined in a 
"distress" industry would probably be present where a "distress" firm was producing at 
undercapacity and heading toward failure. 
92 Id. at 206-07, 439-46. 
93 Id. at 146-49. "Economies of scale" represents that volume of production which 
will permit the lowest cost per unit operation of e.xisting plant and facilities, which 
thereby tends to maximize profits. 
94 Id. at 579-83, where a prime example of this condition, the bituminous coal 
industry, is discussed. 
95 This situation is present whenever an industry is faced with increases in wages, 
materials and costs of distribution. 
96 "Pattern bargaining" is present when an industry-wide labor organization bargains 
with one or a few large firms in the industry. The results achieved from such collective 
bargaining are thereafter presented to the remaining firms who are strongly urged to 
follow the pattern set by the prior agreements. 
97 See S. REP. No. 132, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1957) (reported remarks of George 
A. Romney, former president of American Motors Corp.). 
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Therefore, since Congress intended to allow for a "failing com-
pany" defense, it appears, from a public interest standpoint, that 
such a defense is not only justified, but should be available as 
soon as it can reasonably be determined that the corporation is 
irreversibly headed toward final collapse. Little is to be gained 
from requiring a corporation to have taken the last gasp of its 
business life before an otherwise illegal acquisition would be 
permitted. 
IV. A SUGGESTED STANDARD FOR APPLICATION OF THE 
"FAILING COMPANY' DEFENSE 
Concededly a construction of the "failing company" exception 
which departs from the relatively certain guidelines of actual bank-
ruptcy, receivership or insolvency will require the courts to for-
mulate standards which will be more difficult to apply. Never-
theless, as previously indicated, Congress98 and the Supreme 
Court99 have considered the exception sufficiently important to 
engraft it upon section 7. While not conclusive, some indication 
of recent acceptance of the doctrine can be gleaned from the 
history of the Diebold case, in which the Department of Justice 
did not attempt to disclaim the existence of the exception;100 and, 
even in reversal, the Supreme Court101 gave no indication that 
the doctrine lacked vitality, but only stated that the facts of the 
case were not sufficiently established to support the summary 
judgment of the district court which applied the doctrine in favor 
of the acquiring firm. Therefore, keeping in mind that it is an 
exception to the section, and but for the exception the acquisi-
tion would be condemned, the following represents a suggested 
approach to the problem which, it is submitted, summarizes the 
intent of Congress and is implicit in various case decision~.102 
Simply stated, the suggested approach would employ a balanc-
ing test by which the apparent injury to competition in the rele-
vant market, which is likely to occur if it is determined that the 
acquisition may substantially lessen competition or tend to create 
a monopoly, would be weighed against the probability of counter-
vailing injury to the community, owners, employees and creditors, 
98 See note 8 supra. 
oo International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930). 
100 United States v. Diebold, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 902 (S.D. Ohio, 1961). 
101 United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654 (1962) (per curiam). 
102 See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 302-03 (1930); Erie Sand 
&: Gravel Co. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 279, 280-81 (3d Cir. 1961). See also Brown Shoe Co. v. 
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 331, 334, 346 (1962). 
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and to the economy generally (through misallocation of re-
sources).103 This would require a two-pronged Rule of Reason 
prognostication after it is determined that the merger would other-
wise violate section 7. Considering all relevant factors, there would 
, first be a determination as to whether the declining firm would 
have eventually terminated in failure, and, second, a consideration 
of whether the acquisition was the most reasonable way to achieve 
the desirous "effect of mitigating seriously injurious consequences 
otherwise probable.''104 This would, in turn, require considera• 
tion of past financial and business history of the corporation, profit 
and loss trends and relevant market developments, as well as, if 
applicable, increased cost data. Other factors which determine 
whether the firm could reasonably be expected to have remained 
a competitive force during the period of prognostication must also 
be considered. This would entail an analysis of costs for additional 
capital improvements; a judgment whether these additional in-
vestments could have been undertaken by the firm without ex-
cessive risk or whether the outlook for development and profits 
in the market would not have justified such an outlay; and, finally, 
a determination of whether the present and potential volume of 
the firm would sustain the maximum utilization of additional 
facilities so as to achieve the economies of scale inherent in its 
operations. To aid in obtaining as accurate a forecast as possible, 
if there has been a sufficient time lapse, evidence should be ad-
mitted indicating conditions after the transaction was consum-
mated, keeping the court abreast of current developments.105 
Application of the doctrine would not eliminate the requisite 
attempts to obtain alternative buyers whose acquisition of the 
stock or assets would not be in violation of the act. The effort to 
be expended by the failing firm in this regard would be inversely 
proportional to the state of decline exhibited by it; but there 
should always be a duty of the firm to solicit more than one buyer. 
The question of required acceptance of lower bids from an ac-
ceptable bidder is indeed a difficult one. Frequently the least ac-
ceptable prospective acquirers will be in a position to bid the 
most.106 Again, all that can be suggested is that the acceptance 
103 The weighing of the probability of ultimate failure is not an unfair approach 
since, in essence, it is balanced against another probability test, the § 7 standards. 
104 International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 302 (1930). See also Brown Shoe 
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 346 (1962). 
105 The approach was taken in United States v. Diebold, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 902, 906 
(S.D. Ohio 1961). 
106 This is because, as the dominance of the firm that wishes to acquire increases, 
1963] COMMENTS 583 
of the bid from such a purchaser should have appeared to be the 
most reasonable choice under the circumstances. A court would 
balance such factors as the state of decline of the firm, the effort 
expended by the firm to obtain other offers, the number of bids 
made, the differences in the bids, and the difference between the 
lower bids and that amount likely to be realized if the failing 
company were forced to sell at a distress sale. Similarly, a court 
should not undermine the defense merely because there were 
legal alternatives available unless it is shown that such alternatives 
could have reasonably been expected to have averted the acquired 
or to-be-acquired company's otherwise probable failure. 
International Shoe101 is consistent with this approach once it 
is realized that the case involved two giants in the shoe industry.108 
The probability of injury by the lessening of competition or the 
tendency to create a monopoly was so great that the scales of the 
test were about as heavily weighted in favor of preventing merger 
as possible. Therefore, in order to allow the merger in the face 
of the statutory provisions, the countervailing injury probable in 
the event of failure would also have to have been great, as would 
the likelihood of failure itself. Increased probability of injury on 
the one side would have to have been balanced against that on the 
other side. Both parties were confronted with the severest possible 
fact situations, and still the scales tipped in favor of the "failing 
company" doctrine. With this in mind, that most important para-
graph in the Court's opinion can be construed as establishing a 
true exception to the general scope of section 7, in providing 
" ... that the purchase of its [the failing firm's] capital 
stock by a competitor (there being no other prospective pur-
chaser), not with a purpose to lessen competition, but to 
facilitate the accumulated business of the purchaser and with 
the effect of mitigating seriously injurious consequences 
otherwise probable, is not in contemplation of law prejudi-
cial to the public and does not substantially lessen competi-
tion within the intent of the Clayton Act. To regard such a 
transaction as a violation of the law . . . would 'seem a dis-
tempered view of purchase and result.' "109 
Philip Sotiroff, S.Ed. 
the greater is the likelihood that it is in a position to offer a larger sum, and the more 
objectionable would be the purchase. 
101 280 U.S. at 301-02. 
10s Id. at 304. 
109 Id. at 302-03. 
